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BALANCING OPEN SOURCE PARADIGMS AND 
TRADITIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
MODELS TO OPTIMIZE INNOVATION 
Lisa Mandrusiak* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Copyrights and patents grant property rights to creators and inventors in order 
to spur further innovation through the dual approach of increasing the amount of 
material in the public domain and rewarding inventors and creators for their efforts.  
However, in recent years, it has been postulated that extensive granting of 
copyrights and patents may in fact stifle additional creation and development.  This 
led to a revolt in the computer programming industry and spawned the open source 
movement, which provides software with its source code and a license allowing for 
free creation and distribution of works.  This movement attempts to spur innovation 
in an alternative manner,1 primarily by promoting contribution to the public 
domain.  This open source concept has spread to other realms normally protected 
by copyright through systems like the Creative Commons.  The Creative Commons 
is a non-profit organization devoted to expanding the breadth of creative works 
available in the public domain for others to legally build upon and share.2  The 
organization has released several copyright licenses (known as Creative Commons 
licenses) that authors can choose from and use to protect their works in lieu of 
traditional copyright.  These licenses allow creators to communicate which rights 
they reserve, and which they waive for the benefit of recipients and/or other 
creators.  
Although it does not provide the same commercial gains to creators as 
traditional copyrights, the widespread use of the Creative Commons licenses in the 
digital creative world and subsequent increase of material in the public domain 
suggest that the open source movement may be useful to spur innovation in other 
areas.  Biotechnology, such as genetic and molecular biology research that leads to 
the development of useful therapeutics, is one area where open source was 
postulated to be useful to counter the over-proliferation of patents hypothesized to 
suppress innovation.3  As such, the Boston-based Science Commons was developed 
in 2005 to bring the open source movement to biotechnology through various 
projects designed to increase the amount of scientific data available in the public 
domain.  The implicit goal of the Science Commons project is to replace traditional 
intellectual property systems, such as patents, and to promote innovation by 
increasing access to knowledge conferred through open access approaches.  This 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law.  The Author thanks Professor Thomas 
Ward for his valuable input and advice, and Bernard von Bieberstein for his careful editing. 
 1. See RICHARD M. STALLMAN, The GNU Project, in FREE SOFTWARE FREE SOCIETY:  SELECTED 
ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 15-31 (Joshua Gay ed., 2002). 
 2. CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). 
 3. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?  The Anticommons 
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998). 
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Comment provides the first substantive analysis of whether the Science Commons 
is succeeding in its attempts to promote innovation.  Because there are challenges 
inherent in the practice of biotechnology, such as the large financial costs 
associated with research and development of pharmaceuticals and the absence of an 
appropriate community, this Comment suggests that open source biotechnology as 
envisioned and implemented by the Science Commons is not successful in 
promoting innovation because the Science Commons attempts to promote 
innovation only by increasing the amount of material in the public domain, 
ignoring the incentive effects of rewarding inventors with patent rights and the 
related commercial benefits. 
This Comment postulates a compromise where premarket or “upstream” 
knowledge such as unknown gene sequences is shared through open source 
systems like the Science Commons, but downstream developments such as 
pharmaceuticals that act on the gene to treat a particular disease are patentable 
according to intellectual property norms.  However, this Comment also suggests 
modifying the traditional patent system to be stricter, thereby resulting in fewer 
patents.  This proposed system maximizes shared knowledge by publicizing 
information that is generally not patentable to begin with, potentially making 
further development easier.  This system will also likely encourage innovation at 
all levels, from individual users to large pharmaceutical companies.   
In Part II, this Comment explores the historical background and traditional 
legal practice of copyrights and patents, both of which were developed to increase 
the amount of material in the commons and reward inventors and creators for their 
work with a temporary monopoly.  Part III follows the ideological change 
suggesting that traditional intellectual property norms do not actually promote 
innovation and reveals how an over-proliferation of proprietary rights is now 
considered to stifle innovation.  The open source movement and its attempts to 
solve these problems by increasing the amount of material in the public domain are 
addressed in Part IV of this Comment, with particular attention paid to the 
development of the Creative Commons as an alternative means to copyright to 
promote innovation.  Part V follows the expansion of the Creative Commons model 
to the world of biotechnology and details the three main projects of the Science 
Commons: the Biological Materials Transfer Project, the Scholar’s Copyright 
Project, and the Neurocommons.  In Part VI, these three projects are compared to 
existing practices and critiqued for their effectiveness in promoting innovation, 
with this Comment illustrating that none of the projects are ultimately successful.  
Several theories underlying the failure of the Science Commons are discussed in 
Part VII, one based on the realization that these approaches attempt to promote 
innovation by increasing the amount of material in the public domain without 
invoking the incentive or reward system for inventors and creators.  Based on this 
discussion, an alternative solution is proposed in Part VIII.  In Part IX, this 
Comment concludes that a combination of traditional intellectual property 
protection and open source approaches is the most effective way to promote 
innovation in the field of biotechnology.  
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II.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND PATENT PRACTICE 
The United States Constitution specifies that Congress is authorized “[t]o 
promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes 
to [a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and 
[d]iscoveries . . . .”4  Related to the “useful arts” phrase, one of the first acts of 
Congress was to pass the Copyright Act of 1790,5 which has subsequently 
undergone several reformations broadening the scope of protection and expanding 
the terms of protection to arrive at its current form.6  Although the Copyright Act 
undoubtedly confers valuable rights upon authors without requiring much, or even 
any, effort on their part to secure protection,7 judicial decisions have emphasized 
that the primary purpose of this grant of power is to provide an incentive for 
innovation by increasing the amount of material in the public domain, noting that 
reward to the owner of the patent or copyright is a “secondary consideration.”8  
Copyright law covers the broad range of literary and artistic expression, 
including such varied works as books, public performances, songs, movies, and 
computer programs.9  Ideas themselves are not copyrighted; it is the author’s 
expression of the work in a tangible medium that is protected.10  The copyright 
owner (who may be someone other than the author if the author assigns the 
copyright to another person or entity) has the exclusive right to carry out or 
authorize reproductions, preparation of derivatives, distribution of copies, and 
public performance or display of the copyrighted work.11  If a third party infringes 
                                                                                                     
 4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 5. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed) (current version codified at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101-205 (2006)). 
 6. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-205 (2006).  Section 102 outlines copyrightable subject matter broadly to 
include literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomime, pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works, motion pictures, sound recordings, and other audiovisual works, and architectural 
works.  17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).  Section 302 sets the standard term for copyright protection as the life 
of the author plus seventy years after the author’s death, with various exceptions in subsequent sections 
for anonymous or institutional authors, etc.  17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006).   
 7. Section 102 makes it clear that a copyright automatically exists in any original work of 
authorship fixed in a tangible medium.  17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).  Formality requirements such as 
registration, notice, or marking have largely been abandoned by the United States’ ratification of the 
Berne Convention, which states that copyright shall “not be subject to any formality.”  Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 5(2), Sept. 29, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341. 
 8. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).  See also Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (emphasizing that the limited monopoly 
privileges granted by copyright are the means by which the “important public purpose” of motivating 
creative activity and allowing the public access to such activity may be assured).   
 9. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 10. Id. 
 11. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).  If a third party infringes on any of these rights, the copyright owner 
may sue for an injunction and/or damages.  However, there are limitations to these exclusive rights, such 
as the fair use doctrine.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  Certain uses of copyrighted material that would 
otherwise be considered to be infringing are allowable if they meet the requirements of the fair use 
doctrine.  Id.  Classic examples of uses that are permitted under the doctrine include using the 
copyrighted work for criticism, comment, teaching, or research.  For application of the criteria set forth 
in section 107, see Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that 
research scientists’ photocopying of individual articles from scientific journals for archiving purposes to 
make later research easier was not fair use).  But see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 
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upon any of these rights, the copyright owner may sue for an injunction and/or 
damages.12   
Parallel to protecting the useful arts through copyright, scientific 
improvements were protected by the first patent statute passed in 1790,13 although 
a system including a board of examiners responsible for determining whether to 
grant a patent resembling that of today was not put in place until 1836.14  In 
contemporary practice, examiners from the Patent and Trademark Office review 
each utility patent15 application for patentability based on five criteria:16 (1) utility 
and subject matter; (2) novelty (the invention is not published or known to the 
public prior to filing the application); (3) non-obviousness (inventiveness); (4) 
whether it is described fully in the application; and (5) whether the description 
would allow one skilled in the art to carry out the invention.17  The current term for 
patents is twenty years from the date of filing the application, with limited 
extensions available under some circumstances.18  As with copyright, the Supreme 
Court has reiterated that the primary purpose of patent law is the promotion of 
innovation, rather than the reward of individual effort.19  Promoting innovation is 
achieved by the two-fold approach of (i) increasing the amount of material in the 
public domain after the patent expires and (ii) providing material incentives to 
inventors with the monopoly conferred through the patent rights during the life of 
the patent.20 
Patent law covers new and useful processes, machines, manufacture, 
compositions of matter, and improvements thereof to which a patent has been 
granted,21 and the scope of subject matter protectable under patent law has long 
                                                                                                     
(1994) (applying the fair use doctrine and finding that a parody rap version of Roy Orbison’s well-
known song “Pretty Woman” constituted fair use and, therefore, did not infringe the copyright).  In 
order to use a copyrighted work for purposes that are not considered fair use, it is necessary to obtain the 
consent and authorization of the copyright owner. 
 12. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-05 (2006). 
 13. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-12 (1790) (repealed) (current version codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 1-376 (2006)). 
 14. DONALD S. CHISUM, 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS 5-6 (2009).  The 1836 Act established the Patent 
Office and an examination system where applications were evaluated with respect to novelty over the 
prior art.  Additional requirements such as non-obviousness were not included until the revisions in the 
1956 Act were made.  Id. at 12.   
 15. There are three types of patents: plant patents, design patents, and utility patents.  They all vary 
in terms of requirements for patentability and granted terms of protection.  Since utility patents are the 
most common form of patent and are most pertinent to the following discussion, all later uses of the 
word “patent” should be understood to refer to utility patents only.  
 16. See generally Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (applying these 
criteria). 
 17. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (2006). 
 18. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154-155 (2006). 
 19. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330 (1945).  Later cases have 
reiterated this principle, emphasizing that the primary goals of patent law are fostering and rewarding 
invention and promoting disclosure of inventions in order to stimulate further innovation.  See, e.g., 
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 284 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 20. See Sinclair, 325 U.S. at 330. 
 21. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
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been considered to be “anything under the sun that is made by man.”22  Abstract 
ideas, laws of nature, and physical phenomena such as naturally occurring products 
are excluded from patent protection.23  Once a patent is obtained, the patent confers 
upon the patent owner the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or 
importing the invention.24  If a third party infringes upon any of these rights, the 
patent owner may sue for an injunction and/or damages.25  Therefore, in order to 
make or use a protected invention, a third party must obtain permission from the 
patent owner, usually in the form of a license whereby the patent owner is 
compensated.   
III.  COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAWS ACTUALLY STIFLE INNOVATION 
A.  Problems with Copyright Overprotection: Loss of Innovation  
and Access to Culture 
Despite reiteration by the Supreme Court that promoting innovation is the 
primary goal of the Copyright and Patent Acts, cultural theorists suggest that the 
extensive property rights conferred by patents and copyrights may have precisely 
the opposite effect.  One of the first to voice this position was Richard Stallman, 
who premises his concerns on changes in copyright law that dramatically increased 
the scope and number of proprietary rights of copyright holders, thereby decreasing 
the opportunity of the public to work with and use copyrighted works.26  Numerous 
copyrights can work to prevent access to history and culture, as poignantly 
illustrated by law professor Michael Heller with the example of a documentary 
featuring Martin Luther King, Jr.27  Most of the public is aware of Dr. King’s 
legacy through indirect means such as recorded speeches or collected information 
as presented in the Emmy Award-winning documentary Eyes on the Prize.28  This 
culturally important documentary draws on interviews with hundreds of Dr. King’s 
acquaintances and tremendous numbers of media sources including video footage, 
photographs, and music.29  In order to make the documentary without the threat of 
                                                                                                     
 22. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting the Committee Reports 
accompanying the 1952 Patent Act, S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5 (1952); H. R. REP. NO. 1923, at 6 (1952)). 
 23. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 309. 
 24. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).  There are some exceptions that are not considered to be 
infringement.  See supra, text accompanying note 11.  For example, medical practitioners carrying out a 
patented method of treatment on a patient are free from liability.  35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006).  In 
addition, research performed for the purposes of fulfilling requirements for registration with a federal 
agency, such as the Federal Drug Administration agency, does not constitute infringement.  35 U.S.C.  § 
271(e) (2006).   
 25. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-84 (2006). 
 26. See RICHARD M. STALLMAN, Misinterpreting Copyright—A Series of Errors, in FREE 
SOFTWARE FREE SOCIETY:  SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 77-86 (Joshua Gay ed., 
2002).  Another example is the Audio Home Recording Rights Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., 
which imposed technological design constraints on the manufacture of copying devices.  17 U.S.C. § 
1002 (2006). 
 27. MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY 9 (2008). 
 28. Id.   
 29. Id. at 10. 
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lawsuits, the filmmakers had to secure licenses from each copyright owner.30  
Clearly, even if copyright owners negotiate in good faith, the cost of finding and 
bargaining with each one can be challenging.  In some instances the cost of 
“clearing rights” for each copyright may be prohibitive, as evidenced by the twenty 
years spent in jumping through legal hoops to re-release the film.31  Challenges 
were greater for the re-release than the original version because of the increase in 
the number of copyrights involved.  This increase was due to the expansion in the 
number of partial owners of or heirs to the copyrights and the overall increase in 
the cost of copyright licenses, especially those for music.32  Attempts to re-release 
the film were nearly thwarted, and in some cases the filmmakers could not obtain 
licenses for certain materials, requiring replacement of these materials before the 
film could be shown.33 
In addition to dealing with myriads of copyright holders and the associated 
licensing challenges, changes to copyright law have created additional complexity.  
Stallman asserts that extending copyright terms and preventing digital workarounds 
by implementing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)  shifts the focus 
of copyright law from spurring innovation and aiding the public to assisting large 
publishing and recording companies.34  Expanded proprietary rights can now be 
used as a weapon by publishers to maintain their monopoly by imposing 
restrictions on the general public.  These restrictions are arguably necessary 
because the public now threatens their monopoly in ways as never before by having 
the means to easily produce their own copies inexpensively.35    
Advances in digital technologies and the Internet, and with them the 
commensurate ability of individuals to easily copy, modify, and redistribute 
content, are the underlying premises of Stanford Law School Professor Lawrence 
Lessig’s criticisms of how copyright is stifling, rather than spurring, innovation.36  
Lessig postulates that standard copyright law cannot coexist with the digital 
technologies of today for several reasons.  As it stands now, copyright law confers 
the right to make copies to the copyright owner alone.  However, in this digital age, 
“[e]very act on the Internet is a copy.”37  When surfing the Internet each website or 
image that appears on the computer screen is translated from the code of the 
original website publisher’s site and necessarily conveyed in the form of a digital 
copy.  As such, acts that were unregulated and legal, such as reading a book, are 
                                                                                                     
 30. Id.  The bulk of the licenses expired after the broadcast of the film in 1987, and did not include 
distribution rights for use in new media like DVDs.  Id.  This hampered the filmmakers’ attempts to re-
release the documentary.  Id.   
 31. HELLER, supra note 27, at 11.  
 32. See Katie Dean, Cash Rescues Eyes on the Prize, WIRED (Aug. 30, 2005), 
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2005/08/68664 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). 
 33. HELLER, supra note 27, at 11.  
 34. See RICHARD M. STALLMAN, Copyright and Globalization in the Age of Computer Networks, in 
FREE SOFTWARE FREE SOCIETY:  SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 133-44 (Joshua Gay 
ed., 2002). 
 35. Id.  Examples of improvements to the ease of copying include the transitions from photocopiers 
to scanners, from VCRs to TiVos, and music production technology, such as CD/DVD burners, 
samplers, etc.   
 36. Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 65 MONT. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2004).  
 37. Id. at 6-7. 
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now regulated within the scope of copyright law when carried out in the digital 
environment.38   
Lessig also points out that digital advances and the laws that authorize them39 
are dramatically altering the way that copyright is enforced.40  For instance, before 
the use of the Internet became widespread, copyright violations were regulated 
through the courts, and a judge was ultimately responsible for determining whether 
a violation existed or whether a user’s conduct was permissible.41  Now, 
programming code written into digital technologies dictates what access a user is 
entitled to, and the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA ensure that a user 
cannot get around such code.42  In this sense, the copyright holders are enforcing 
copyrights themselves, rather than through the traditional court system.  
Legal activists are responding to the change in regulation and enforcement of 
copyright law and potential abuse thereof through undertakings such as the Chilling 
Effects Clearinghouse, a group dedicated to protecting online activity from 
copyright-based legal threats that may be impermissible violations of free speech.43  
Concerned Internet activists founded the group in 2001 based on the observation 
that the unregulated private practice of sending cease-and-desist letters under the 
auspices of the DMCA was increasing and potentially having a “chilling effect” on 
speech and fair use of copyrighted material.44  Specifically, although fair use of 
copyrighted material is permitted,45 it is necessary for a user of software protected 
by the DMCA to break the provisions of the DMCA in order to carry out a fair use.  
As such, the DMCA can be viewed as preventing access to materials that would 
otherwise be in the public domain.  Although Stallman, Lessig, and Heller base 
their positions on different aspects of copyright practice, they all reach the same 
conclusion, and in light of this, it appears that the Supreme Court’s long-standing 
assertion that copyrights promote innovation46 may not be accurate. 
B.  Problems with Patent Overprotection: Tragedy of the Anticommons 
Concern that changes in the implementation, scope, and enforcement of 
copyright law are stifling innovation has been echoed in the world of patents.  
                                                                                                     
 38. Id.  
 39. For example, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 
2860 (1998) (adding 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–1205 and 28 U.S.C. § 4001, and substantially amending 
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104, 104A, 108, 112, 114, 117, 701).   
 40. Lessig, supra note 36, at 7-8. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. 
 43. CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.chillingeffects.org/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) 
(with contributors from the Harvard, Stanford, Berkeley, University of San Francisco, University of 
Maine School of Law, George Washington School of Law, and Santa Clara University School of Law 
clinics).  
 44. Id.  In some instances, overly aggressive tactics or misrepresentations by copyright owners to 
suppress legal activities have even led to law suits.  See, e.g., Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., 391 
F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (tortuous interference, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress); 
Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (misrepresentation of 
copyright infringement and tortuous interference).   
 45. See supra note 11.  
 46. See cases cited, supra note 8. 
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Michael Heller, a professor at the Michigan Law School, has postulated that the 
existence of numerous patent proprietary rights can preclude achieving a socially 
desirable outcome, a situation he termed the “tragedy of the anticommons.”47  
Heller describes this situation as occurring in the field of biomedical research, 
where the proliferation of fragmented and overlapping intellectual property rights 
creates an anticommons that stifles scientific research.48  Supporters of this position 
point to increased privatization encouraged by laws that have promoted patenting 
biotechnology inventions in universities, such as the Bayh-Dole Act.49  The trend 
of increased university patenting has snowballed as institutions become dependent 
on licensing revenues from commercially successful patented technologies and the 
associated prestige.50  However, because only a small number of patents lead to 
commercial success, patenting is a bit of a lottery system,51 although the risks of 
obtaining a patent are not just un-recouped expenses for the university, but also lost 
opportunities for other researchers who are blocked from carrying out downstream 
research without obtaining a license.  
The problem with an increased number of upstream patents or patents 
generally related to research tools (rather than to marketable products such as 
pharmaceuticals) has been succinctly summarized by law professor Mark Lemley: 
“[W]hile in theory patents spur innovation, they can also interfere with it.  Broad 
patents granted to initial inventors can lock up or retard improvements needed to 
take a new field from interesting lab results to commercial viability.”52  A recent 
survey indicates that scientists attribute problems of delayed or blocked access to 
necessary materials and knowledge to poor management of intellectual property 
rights, with no correlative benefits in spurring innovation.53  
                                                                                                     
 47. See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 622 (1998).  In this article Heller notes that after the fall of 
Communism, there were many open air kiosks in front of empty stores in cities, and concludes that, 
since many agencies and private parties had proprietary rights governing the use of store space, it was 
extremely challenging for a new retailer to negotiate the use of that space.  This prevented the effective 
use of store front property, and became the classic example of the tragedy of the anticommons.  Id. at 
622-24. 
 48. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 701. 
 49. Universities and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 
(1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000)); Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are 
Universities Adding to the Cost?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1378-84 (2007).  Professor de Larena notes 
that, although the stated intention of the Bayh-Dole Act was to standardize the rules of ownership 
regarding inventions created using federal research funds, the impact has been much wider, and Bayh-
Dole is commonly perceived as the impetus behind a dramatic increase in the number of patents 
obtained by universities.  Id.  The Bayh-Dole Act provides strong incentives to apply for patents because 
patent rights are granted to the inventors, rather than to the government funding agency.  Megan Ristau 
Baca, Barriers to Innovation: Intellectual Property Transaction Costs in Scientific Collaboration, 2006 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4, ¶ 14, http://www.law.duke.edu/ journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2006dltr0004.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2010).      
 50. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 49, at 1381. 
 51. Id. at 1381-82. 
 52. Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 618-19 (2005).   
 53. Zhen Lei et al., Patents Versus Patenting: Implications of Intellectual Property Protection for 
Biological Research, 27 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 36, 37-38 (2009).  However, a dissenting group of 
scholars suggest that the rise in the level of biotechnology patenting has no adverse effect on innovation.  
312 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1 
A more nuanced view is that while innovation is proceeding, at least in some 
areas, there are also problematic areas where a proliferation of patents is hampering 
the progression of crucial research.  For example, negotiating licenses and transfer 
of material for even a single patented product may be prohibitively costly and time-
consuming for legally unsophisticated scientists or those researching diseases 
unlikely to be commercially successful.54  The number of patents involved 
multiplies these prohibitive costs, and obtaining licenses, necessary to avoid the 
even more costly problem of infringement litigation, becomes an extremely 
daunting task.   
The consequences of high transaction costs are stifled innovation and less 
research.  Such stifling may prevent drug development in any area, but it is 
particularly notable in relation to diseases prevalent in developing countries 
because pharmaceutical companies are not interested in investing in areas where 
they believe they will not be able to make the large returns needed to justify their 
initial legal investment.  In addition, the smaller companies and university research 
labs that do work on these projects are stymied by their inability to gain sufficient 
and timely access to needed patented subject matter.55   
The tragedy of the anticommons in preventing crucial drug development has 
been articulated by Bennett Shapiro, former vice president of Merck & Co., Inc. 
(Merck), in relation to schizophrenia.56  Shapiro states:  
[People taking] compounds for schizophrenia, a disorder of the dopamine system, 
often develop other disorders some of which resemble Parkinson’s disease, 
another disease involving the dopamine system.  A rational approach to discovery 
of improved schizophrenia drugs would be to target specific dopamine receptors.  
But if different companies hold patents on different receptors, the first step on the 
path to an important and much needed therapeutic advance can be blocked.57 
The implications of patent over-proliferation are underscored by examining the 
whole process a company such as Merck must go through to bring a potential drug 
to the market.  For example, Merck must uncover any potential side effects of a 
compound before spending millions of dollars on clinical tests and development.  
However, if the materials necessary for undergoing research to determine side 
effects (such as new or improved assays,58 crucial proteins such as dopamine 
receptors, etc.) are patented, the research phase becomes prohibitively expensive.59  
Specifically, before Merck can test the compound with a particular receptor using 
the correct assay, Merck must obtain a license from every patent owner involved.  
This onerous task is necessary because in order to be approved for use, the 
                                                                                                     
David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of Innovation in the 
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 54. Lee Petherbridge, Road Map to Revolution? Patent-Based Open Science, 59 ME. L. REV. 339, 
355 (2007). 
 55. Ann Weilbaecher, Comment, Diseases Endemic in Developing Countries: How to Incentivize 
Innovation, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 281, 285 (2009).   
 56. HELLER, supra note 27, at 53. 
 57. Id. 
 58. An assay is a biological or immunological test carried out in a laboratory, often to detect the 
presence or absence of a substance in a sample or the activity level of a drug or the like.   
 59. HELLER, supra note 27, at 54. 
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compound must be demonstrably safe and effective.  Therefore, every patent 
involved becomes a “tollbooth” where Merck must pay money to the patent owner, 
and if it is determined that the entire field of research will be too costly, Merck will 
simply abandon the project and move on to an area of research that is less 
challenging both legally and financially.60  Unfortunately, the real loser in this 
scenario is the public, which is denied access to a potential cure to a devastating 
disease.  Therefore, as with copyrights, it appears that the Supreme Court’s 
assertion61 that patents promote innovation may not be accurate. 
IV. CURING STIFLED INNOVATION:  DEVELOPMENT OF THE  
OPEN SOURCE MOVEMENT 
The first allegation that proprietary laws such as the Copyright Act of 1976 
were not stimulating innovation came from the computer programming industry.  
In the early days of computer programming, proprietary restrictions on the source 
code of software were rare and hackers shared their code widely.62  However, one 
consequence of the Copyright Act of 1976 was that many manufacturers stopped 
distributing source code and began using copyright and restrictive software licenses 
to limit or prohibit copying and redistribution to prevent software from being 
appropriated by their competitors.63  These increased copyright restrictions have 
been suggested to be counterproductive to the innovation and knowledge 
generation that copyright was intended to encourage.64  Although the hacker 
community resented this change, most of them were able to work within the 
system.65  However, Richard Stallman, a computer hacker working at MIT, was not 
                                                                                                     
 60. Id.  However, there may be some relief for companies like Merck in sight.  The research 
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 61. See supra note 19. 
 62. Brewster Kahle, a hacker at MIT in the 1970s and 1980s, discusses the effect of the Copyright 
Act of 1976, emphasizing that before the Act copyrights had to be affirmatively asserted, so many works 
were not copyrighted.  Transcript of Interview with Brewster Kahle, NerdTV #4: Brewster Kahle, PBS, 
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 63. Id. 
 64. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS (2001) [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF 
IDEAS] (postulating that  aspects of the internet that are part of the commons promoted the tremendous 
innovation that resulted in the Internet as we know it, and warning that changes in copyright and patent 
laws will stifle further creativity and progress unless users fight back).  Lessig states: 
The argument of this book is that always and everywhere, free resources have been 
crucial to innovation and creativity; that without them, creativity is crippled.  Thus, and 
especially in the digital age, the central question becomes not whether government or the 
market should control a resource, but whether a resource should be controlled at all.  
Id. at 14. 
 65. JANET HOPE, BIOBAZAAR 7-8 (2008). 
314 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1 
among them.66   
Stallman fought back by developing a “free” software project (where “free” 
refers to the liberty of others to use source code for any purpose rather than price) 
based on an operating system he developed called GNU.67  Stallman launched the 
GNU project in 1984 together with the GNU Manifesto, which explained the 
purpose of the project to hackers and requested their participation and support.68  
The GNU project works together with the Free Software Foundation to ensure free 
software remains a part of the public domain, promoting innovation by ensuring 
that software remains accessible to all to build on and change as they please.69  
In order to achieve this goal, Stallman created a license that focuses on “the 
rights of software users instead of software owners,” called a “copyleft” license, 
now referred to as the General Public License (GPL).70  The GPL elegantly 
guarantees that further innovations belong to the public: under its terms the owner 
of the work grants users broad rights to use, modify, or distribute the work in any 
way they like, free of charge.71  If a user builds on the work and develops a new 
product or a modified version, the user must make the new work freely available to 
the public under the same terms.72  In other words, the license grants users access 
to a continually growing commons from which they cannot withdraw.   
Hackers embraced the GPL, thereby ensuring its success and the thriving 
development of a large computer programming public commons.  The most well 
known example is Linux: an operating system developed communally by hackers 
based on the terms of the GPL.73  Although Linux is an operating system generally 
favored by computer programmers rather than by the public for use on personal 
computers, the Internet as we know it would not exist except for open source 
software.74   For example, the 100,000 servers at Google all run on Linux and are 
widely used by the public.75  
The development of Linux, the crowning success of Stallman’s free software 
movement, marked the birth of a closely related, but philosophically different 
branch-off: open source software.76  The Open Source Initiative (OSI), recognizing 
the successes of the Free Software Foundation and the GPL, hopes to improve upon 
them by combining the free software concept with the standard proprietary model 
to reach a broader community.77   The OSI acknowledges the superiority of free 
software, noting: 
                                                                                                     
 66. Id. at 4-5, 8. 
 67. Id. at 8-9.  GNU is a recursive acronym standing for “‘Gnu’s Not UNIX.’”  Id. at 9. 
 68. Id. at 9.  For a copy of the GNU Manifesto, see The GNU Manifesto, GNU OPERATING SYSTEM, 
http://www.gnu.org/gnu/manifesto.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). 
 69. FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, http://www.fsf.org/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).  
 70. HOPE, supra note 65, at 11.  
 71. See GNU General Public License, GNU.ORG, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2010). 
 72. Id.  
 73. HOPE, supra note 65, at 11-13. 
 74. Id. at 16 (stating that “the Internet is built, overwhelmingly, on open source software”). 
 75. Id.  
 76. David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin’s Genome, or Coase and Open Source Biotechnology, 18 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167, 180 (2004).  
 77. Id. 
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When programmers can read, redistribute, and modify the source code for a piece 
of software, the software evolves.  People improve it, people adapt it, people fix 
bugs and this can happen at a speed that, if one is used to the slow pace of 
conventional software development, seems astonishing.  We in the open source 
community have learned that this rapid evolutionary process produces better 
software than the traditional closed source model, in which only a very few 
programmers can see the source and everybody else must blindly use an opaque 
block of bits.78 
The OSI created the open source movement based on this superiority, 
expanding the reaches of the free software movement from the hacker community 
to commercial users.  The open source movement merges the key concept of free 
software, providing the source code, with the more traditional proprietary norms of 
copyrights, maintaining that some intellectual property law needs to exist to protect 
cultural producers.79  Under the open source movement, the rights to be retained by 
the copyright holder are self-determined by the copyright holder’s choice of 
license.80  For example, the Artistic License 2.0 (one among many licenses 
selectable) is designed such that the copyright holder maintains some artistic 
control over the development of the work by allowing users to freely copy and 
distribute the work, but not to change and then distribute changed versions of the 
work.81  This approach attempts to promote innovation by increasing the amount of 
material in the public domain in combination with conferring rights to the creator.  
However, the rights retained by the creator tend to be along the lines of artistic 
control rather than rights that may be exploited for commercial gain.  
The success of the open source software movement sparked interest in other 
areas, and projects expanding the concept of open source to other domains 
traditionally protected by copyright were born.  The most prevalent of these is 
Creative Commons, founded in 2001 by cultural activist Lawrence Lessig.82 
Lessig’s concerns regarding accessibility to creative cultural works and the 
dramatic expansion of copyright terms and coverage83 guides Creative Commons’ 
attempts to promote innovation by increasing access to creative works in the public 
domain and providing a series of licenses users can choose from, communicating 
which rights they reserve and which rights they waive for the benefit of recipients 
or other creators.84  As with the OSI, the approach Creative Commons adopts 
                                                                                                     
 78. OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE (Nov. 28, 2006, 2:04 AM), http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20061128020422/http://www.opensource.org/ (last accessed by searching for www.opensource.org in 
the Internet Archive Index, Oct. 19, 2010). 
 79. HOPE, supra note 65, at 15. 
 80. Licensing, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE (Sept. 24, 2006, 1:21 PM), http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20060924132143/http://www.opensource.org/licenses/index.php (last accessed by searching for 
www.opensource.org/licenses/index.php in the Internet Archive Index, Oct. 19, 2010).  
 81. Artistic License 2.0, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, http://www.opensource.org/licenses/artistic-
license-2.0.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). 
 82. History, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about/history/ (last visited Oct. 19, 
2010) [hereinafter History]. 
 83. See THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 64, at 106-07 (describing the expanded scope of current 
copyright protection); see also id. at 250-57 (describing changes Lessig would like to see in copyright 
law). 
 84. See History, supra note 82 (detailing the exponential growth of Creative Commons around the 
world).  As of 2009, Creative Commons has provided licenses for over 130 million works.  Id.  
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confers rights to the creator generally related to artistic control rather than rights 
which can be exploited for commercial gain, unlike those associated with 
traditional copyright.    
V.  OPEN SOURCE PARADIGMS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE SCIENCE COMMONS 
Based on the presumption that excessive patenting stifles innovation in fields 
such as biotechnology, Creative Commons launched a new project in 2005 called 
Science Commons.85  Although not explicitly put forth by Science Commons, the 
implicit goal appears to be promoting innovation by using open source strategies to 
replace traditional intellectual property systems such as patents.  The stated goal of 
Science Commons is to promote “faster, more efficient web-enabled scientific 
research” by identifying and lowering “unnecessary barriers to research” and 
thereby “unlocking the value of research so more people can benefit from the work 
scientists are doing.”86  In other words, the goal of Science Commons is to promote 
innovation for the benefit of the public, just as the goal of the Intellectual Property 
clause in the Constitution and subsequent patent legislation is to promote 
innovation for the benefit of the public.87  Therefore, in order to be successful, 
Science Commons must promote innovation at least as much as the systems 
currently in place.  
Science Commons is designed to build on Creative Commons’ approach, and 
is based on the belief that innovation carried out by scientific enterprises is 
impossible without easy access to materials, publications, and data.88  Therefore, 
Science Commons launched projects to improve access in these three areas by 
increasing the volume of, and accessibility to, materials in the public domain.89  
The following discussion describes how three of these projects are intended to 
work.  The success of the projects is addressed separately.    
A.  The Biological Materials Transfer Project 
Biological materials are essential to biotechnology research.  Cell lines,90 DNA 
probes,91 and animal models92 are examples of biological materials that are crucial 
for testing and validating hypotheses.  Conducting research with specific materials 
provides key information that cannot be replicated without access to that specific 
material.  However, despite the importance of biological materials for scientific 
research, material transfer remains overly complex, which significantly impacts the 
quantity and quality of research. 
Biological materials are routinely transferred between labs subject to the terms 
                                                                                                     
 85. SCIENCE COMMONS, http://sciencecommons.org/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See supra notes 8, 19 and accompanying text. 
 88. See SCIENCE COMMONS, supra note 85. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Cell lines are a single type of cell adapted to grow continuously when cultured in a laboratory.   
 91. A DNA probe is a single-stranded DNA molecule used in laboratory experiments to detect the 
presence of a complementary sequence among a mixture of DNA fragments, which can indicate 
presence or absence of a particular gene or mutation.   
 92. An animal model is a laboratory animal useful for research because it has specific 
characteristics that resemble a human disease or disorder.   
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of material transfer agreements (MTAs).93  These agreements, drafted by individual 
institutions, are often complex documents, requiring coordination between lawyers 
and technology transfer offices of the respective institutions rather than allowing 
for a simple exchange of material between scientists.94  MTAs formalize the 
relationship between the provider and the recipient of the material, and set forth 
rules regarding commercial exploitation or publication of research based on the 
material.95  Using such licenses generally involves significant transaction costs and 
delays, which can be crucial in research, particularly for small researchers.  In 
worst-case scenarios, negotiations for a material transfer can be so protracted and 
painful that a scientist may find it easier to re-make the material, often at taxpayer 
expense.96     
The Biological Materials Transfer Project is dedicated to improving access to 
biological materials required by researchers, and draws heavily on the success of 
the Creative Commons licenses.  This project provides standard modular contracts 
that researchers can access on the Science Commons website and then employ to 
lower the costs of transferring biological materials such as DNA, cell lines, and 
model animals.97 
B.  The Scholar’s Copyright Project 
Scientific research has long been recorded in paper form to allow research to 
be critiqued and built upon by others.  Furthermore, scientific success is often 
evaluated based on the number of publications a researcher has and the prestige of 
the journals in which the research is published.98  Digital technologies replicate 
paper technology and permit instantaneous publishing and copying of research.  
However, the legal aspects of copyright associated with sharing research through 
paper have not been adapted appropriately to the digital world.99   
A unique aspect of copyright law in relation to publishing scientific research is 
that, traditionally, the author of an article was required to transfer his or her rights 
in the copyright to the journal publisher, allegedly necessary to protect the 
copyright and coordinate reprints and the like.  This is a practice that has continued 
into the digital age—as owners of the copyright, online publishers can prevent 
authors and people who purchase licenses to view articles from making archival 
copies of the articles.100 
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Many authors and readers have found this approach to be unsatisfactory, 
spawning the Open Access (OA) movement.101  Under this approach, the publisher 
obtains a license to publish and the author retains the copyright in exchange for 
paying a fee.102  However, as with MTAs discussed above, the solution to the 
problem can be complex and legally sophisticated and may require a lawyer to 
carry out the transaction.  The Scholar’s Copyright Project attempts to lower the 
barriers to OA by reducing transaction costs and eliminating contract 
proliferation.103  Through the Scholar’s Copyright Project, Science Commons 
offers a spectrum of tools and resources catering to authors who wish to publish 
their work and retain copyright ownership.  The Scholar’s Copyright Project does 
this either by helping authors publish in an OA journal, or by negotiating a license 
where the author may archive a copy of his or her article and make it freely 
available on the Internet if they wish.104   
C.  The Neurocommons  
In addition to gleaning information from empirical studies, biotechnology 
researchers have access to myriad knowledge sources that must be reviewed and 
incorporated into their experimental design and analysis.  Some of the knowledge 
sources available are peer reviewed journals, patent applications, and online 
databases of genetic or protein sequences.  As a result, many scientists spend as 
much time on Google and PubMed105 as they do at the laboratory bench.  The 
founders of Science Commons posit that the explosion of available information in 
biotechnology research overwhelms any one individual’s ability to store and model 
all the relevant science in his or her head.106  The result is problematic: methods for 
generating information have gone digital and quasi infinite, while methods for 
processing and using that information remain neurological.107 
The goal of the Neurocommons project is to assuage the aforementioned issue 
and maximize the availability and the usability of scientific research materials such 
as research articles, knowledge bases, research data, and physical materials.108  In 
order to achieve this goal, the Neurocommons project attempts to render existing 
databases and search engines interoperable through the “Semantic Web.”  The 
Semantic Web uses the current World Wide Web as we know it, but adopts 
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common formats and uses the same language and nomenclature so that existing 
data may be integrated and combined, thus becoming more accessible to 
researchers.109  John Wilbanks, Executive Director of Science Commons, describes 
his image of the Neurocommons: 
With this system, scientists will be able to load in lists of genes that come off the 
lab robots, and get back those lists of genes with relevant information around them 
based on the public knowledge.  They’ll be able to find the papers and pieces of 
data where that information came from, much faster and more relevant than 
Google or a full text literature search, because for all the content in our system, 
we’ve got links back to the underlying sources.  And they’ve each got an incentive 
to put their own papers into the system, or to make their corner of the system more 
accurate for the better the system models their research, the better results they’ll 
get.  We’ll be inviting the bioinformatics community to work on both the content 
and the analytic software.  Neither one can easily reach potential in a single 
organization.110 
As a test model, the Neurocommons project focuses on sources specific to 
neuroscience and neuromedicine, rather than all biotechnology research fields.  
Neuroscience is a particularly apt focus area because of the tremendous amount of 
public data available from the use of computer-implemented research techniques 
such as high throughput screening and gene chips.111 
VI.  CRITICISMS OF THE SCIENCE COMMONS PROJECTS 
Despite their laudable aims of increasing the availability and amount of 
material in the public domain for researchers to use, the Biological Materials 
Transfer, the Scholar’s Copyright, and the Neurocommons projects are ineffective 
at promoting innovation.  The Biological Materials Transfer Project largely mirrors 
an existing system, and is therefore redundant.  Similarly, the complications that 
the Scholar’s Copyright Project attempts to address are not severe enough to 
actually prevent authors from utilizing currently available forms of open access 
publishing, thus rendering the project unnecessary.  Finally, as will be elaborated 
below, the Neurocommons is unusable for researchers who lack significant 
computer programming knowledge.  Even if this project is imagined to be user-
friendly and fully functional, it is unlikely that providing access to more data will 
promote innovation, as discussed below. 
A.  The Biological Materials Transfer Project is Redundant 
The Biological Materials Transfer Project does not contribute anything 
substantial to the world of scientific research because public and universal material 
transfer agreements already exist and are widely used.  In the hope of “alleviating 
some of the paperwork associated with MTAs,” the National Institute of Health 
established the Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement (UBMTA) for use 
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by non-profit organizations.112  Institutions that sign the master agreement are able 
to transfer materials under the agreement with other institutions through the use of 
a simple implementing letter.113  As of 2007, there were 320 institutions signed 
onto the UBMTA master agreement.114   
Critics might point out that the UBMTA does not solve the problems the 
Biological Materials Transfer Project attempts to address because it is only for use 
by non-profits and cannot serve as a model for a profit-minded company because of 
different policies, procedures, valuations, and objectives that must be written into 
the contract.   However, non-profit organizations are the entities likely to have the 
most difficulty navigating the legal and financial hurdles of obtaining an MTA.  In 
contrast to an independent researcher affiliated with a university, even a small 
biotechnology or pharmaceutical company is likely able to afford legal assistance 
to draft an appropriate MTA when necessary.  As such, the Biological Materials 
Transfer Project is largely superfluous in light of the availability of, and advances 
made by, the UBMTA. 
Furthermore, the biotechnology research community often functions like the 
hacker community, lamented by Richard Stallman as being lost,115 where members 
cooperate with each other without involving institutions and their associated 
formalities.  For example, a student researcher may come across an article 
describing a cell line that would be particularly suitable for use in her experiments.  
Under the formal process, the student would go to the university’s technology 
transfer office and request them to draft a request to the institution where the 
research regarding the cell line was initiated.  The other institution would then 
prepare an MTA based on their desired terms, and the student’s technology office 
would agree, disagree, or modify the MTA.  However, much more commonly, the 
student will simply contact the author directly and request a small sample of the 
cell line.  The author often chooses to respond to the informal request positively 
and sends a sample to the student.  Although there are situations where a request 
for informal transfer is unsuccessful,116 in my experience they are relatively rare.117 
B.  The Scholar’s Copyright Project is Unnecessary 
Open access publishing had already successfully taken off before the Scholar’s 
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Copyright Project was established, making this tool unnecessary.  As such, the 
Scholar’s Copyright Project does little to promote innovation by increasing access 
to research data.  The Public Library of Science (PLS), a nonprofit organization of 
scientists and physicians and a pioneer in open access publishing, launched its first 
journal in 2003118 and has since expanded to seven well-regarded, broad-topic 
journals.119  PLS has been joined in the field by other prolific open access 
publishers such as BioMed Central, with 206 journals,120 and the Directory of Open 
Access Journals, which includes free, full text, quality controlled scientific and 
scholarly journals of all subjects and languages, currently boasting 5,358 
journals.121 
Furthermore, some open access scientific journals currently use a Creative 
Commons license.122  Suggesting that authors may need additional assistance to 
navigate such licenses actually undermines the purpose of the Creative Commons 
program123 and underscores this Comment’s assertion that the Scholar’s Copyright 
Project is not actually required or relevant.    
A potential problem with open access publishing that the Scholar’s Copyright 
Project fails to address is that authors may be less concerned with increasing 
accessibility to their work and more concerned with the impact factor124 of the 
journal in which they publish.  Many authors eschewed publishing in or even 
subscribing to open access journals in the early days of open access publishing for 
just these reasons.125  In the past, the prestige of open access journals had been 
considered lower than that of traditional journals for various reasons;126 however, 
this may no longer be the case.  Standard measures of the prestige of scientific 
journals such as impact factor or the number of citations now rank open access 
journals on the same levels as traditional journals.127  
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and are routinely awarded impact factors of approximately thirty.  See Impact Factor, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impact_factor (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).  Well-renowned specialty 
journals such as GENOMICS generally rate around 3.  GENOMICS, http://www.elsevier.com/ 
wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/622838/description#description (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).  In 
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C.  The Neurocommons is Unusable 
Unfortunately, the Neurocommons is largely unusable to researchers who are 
not also computer programmers, as acknowledged by the Science Commons 
group.128  In its simplest form, the Neurocommons integrates a number of existing 
public databases and allows a researcher to search them all simultaneously.  
However, at this time, searches can only be run if they are written in a rare 
computer code called SPARQL.129  It can be assumed that the average researcher 
working in a laboratory would be unable to access these grouped databases and 
would therefore resort to the current method of searching databases one at a time.  
Even assuming the Neurocommons has a successful, user-friendly interface, 
the concept is flawed: preventing access to data cannot logically be seen as the 
problem in innovation caused by an over-proliferation in patents.130  Researchers 
are never at a loss for experiments to run because they cannot read enough journals 
or find related gene sequences or interacting proteins.  Even in the digital world, 
scientific innovation still proceeds based on the analog time frame of the individual 
cogitations required to interpret data and design experiments.  Therefore, high tech 
solutions, such as the Neurocommons, that aim to increase access to data will not 
be useful in speeding up research because each new piece of information must be 
analyzed by the researcher for relevance and the appropriate hypotheses must be 
adopted and tested.  
As such, the Neurocommons, like the Biotechnology Materials Transfer 
Project and the Scholar’s Copyright Project, is unlikely to promote innovation in 
biotechnology.  By understanding the reasons underlying the failure of Science 
Commons, a potential workable solution may become evident.   
VII.  ANALYZING THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SCIENCE COMMONS CONCEPT 
A.  Biotechnology is Not a Suitable Candidate for Open Source Approaches 
As detailed in Parts IV and V of this Comment, Science Commons is modeled 
on Creative Commons and the Open Source Movement.  In the open source 
software model, users of the software are assumed to contribute widely to the 
improvement of the projects, and the project grows and expands as a result.  
However, law professor Yochai Benkler has postulated that this model cannot be 
extrapolated easily to biotechnology research.   
Benkler established criteria for determining whether open source production 
                                                                                                     
2006, PLOS BIOLOGY was awarded an impact factor of 14.7 and PLOS MEDICINE of 13.8.  PLOS, 
http://www.plos.org/cms/node/233 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). 
 128. See The Neurocommons, SCIENCE COMMONS, http://sciencecommons.org/projects/data/ (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2010) (stating that in the “short term this is most valuable to people who already know 
how to use it. The skill set is rare and still considered a specialty.  But over time the use of machine-
annotation should evolve into a mainstream part of biology, just as the use of machine-generated data 
has evolved”).   
 129. See The NeuroCommons Project, SCIENCE COMMONS, http://neurocommons.org/page/ 
Main_Page (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). 
 130. Scientists may publish findings less frequently or not at all in order to preserve the novelty of 
their invention, a requirement to obtain a patent.  See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.  
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methods can extend to new fields such as biotechnology.131  According to Benkler, 
the technology must first be divided into layers.132  Using the Internet as an 
example, the layers are the hardware layer (the machines running the network), the 
software or code layer (the information traveling over the network), and the content 
layer (the information being communicated).133  The next step is determining 
whether open source paradigms would be feasible and efficient with respect to any 
layer.134  For Benkler, feasibility generally requires that a layer be divisible into 
small components that can be worked on by many users.135   
Benkler’s analysis can be applied to biotechnology to determine whether it is a 
suitable candidate for open source.  Law professor David Opderbeck carried out 
this analysis, splitting a biological system, such as an organism, into hardware 
(cells and tissues), software (genetic code), and content (protein interaction and 
chemical pathways) layers.136  Opderbeck concludes that the code layer of 
biotechnology, gene sequence data, is a possible candidate for use in an open 
source system, but determines that the robust competition in this field would 
prevent development of an open source system.137    
There are additional theoretical complications suggesting that biotechnology 
may not be a suitable field for implementation of open source systems.  For 
instance, innovation in biotechnology involves significantly higher costs than areas 
such as software development.  Complex reagents and equipment are prohibitively 
expensive, and as a result, there are few, if any, individual researchers: most 
research is carried out on behalf of an institution.138  For this reason, the material 
incentives of exclusive patent rights are likely key in order to promote innovation 
and are even required to provide a rich public domain.  The artistic control 
conferred to creators by the rights awarded through systems like Creative 
Commons would be an insufficient incentive for biotechnology researchers and/or 
their backers.    
The involvement of deep-pocketed institutions in biotechnology research leads 
to the next potential problem: there is no “user” community in biotechnology 
collaborating on the same project akin to the hacker community underlying the 
open source software movement.139  Opderdeck postulates that the social-
psychological rewards inherent in the hacker community were the driving force of 
open source development therein, and an equivalent community/reward system 
would be necessary for open source to be successful in other areas.140  In fact, users 
                                                                                                     
 131. See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 
(2002).   
 132. Id. at 378-79. 
 133. FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 64, at 23-25.  
 134. Benkler, supra note 131, at 379. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Opderbeck, supra note 76, at 183-85. 
 137. See id. at 226.   
 138. Petherbridge, supra note 54, at 364. 
 139. Although this Comment analogizes researchers to hackers in terms of sharing materials in supra 
Part VI, hackers as “users” of a single large scale programming project such as Linux where commercial 
reward is unlikely to occur are distinguishable.  Scientific researchers all work on different projects; 
collaborations, as among hackers, are rare.  
 140. Opderdeck, supra note 76, at 192.   
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in other fields (tending to be non-commercial) have also contributed discoveries to 
the public domain without requiring compensation,141 supporting the notion that a 
community of individual users is requisite for an open source development and 
distribution system to function.  
B.  Problems Underlying Open Source Approaches 
Even if biotechnology was a suitable candidate for implementation of open 
source approaches, there are problems underlying these approaches that prevent 
their success in promoting innovation.  One potential problem with Creative 
Commons and open source licenses is that it may be difficult to enforce such 
licenses.  To date, there has been no litigation concerning the validity of Creative 
Commons licenses.  Most disputes involving the open source General Public 
License (GPL) have been settled through negotiation, and although two court cases 
that have considered the GPL have held it to be valid, enforcement questions still 
exist.142  In fact, it has not been clearly determined whether these licenses are 
enforceable contracts or bare licenses.143  If open source licenses are considered to 
be enforceable contracts, licensors will benefit from stronger enforcement of the 
specific terms within the license.144  However, if the license is a bare license 
permitting one to exercise rights that would otherwise be prohibited (such as a 
driver’s license), there is no mutual obligation created between the parties.145  
Without clarity as to the validity and enforcement of such licenses, users may be 
justifiably hesitant to employ these strategies in light of the substantial legal 
uncertainties about the validity of open source licenses in general and specific 
license provisions in particular.  Given current practices and the financial 
investment inherent in most biotechnology research and development, it makes 
perfect sense that a biotechnology company would be unwilling to adopt an open 
source strategy for sharing knowledge or resources if the terms of such a license 
may ultimately prove to be unenforceable.  
Another reason that the Science Commons may not be successful at promoting 
innovation is that it is based on the assumption that the Creative Commons and 
Open Source Movement are themselves successful in promoting innovation.  
However, it may be that these movements are not as successful as proponents 
claim.  In the creative utopia envisioned by Stallman, each user of a piece of open 
source software would use the software for their own individual purposes, 
improving and altering the code as appropriate, and releasing the improved code 
back into the public domain.  The system does not actually work in this manner.  
For most open source projects, there are many users, but only a few developers 
                                                                                                     
 141. Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 467, 475-81 (2008). 
 142. Adrienne K. Goss, Codifying a Commons: Copyright, Copyleft, and the Creative Commons 
Project, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 963, 984 (2007) (citing Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Quest Software, Inc., 
333 F. Supp. 2d 688 (N.D. Ill. 2004), Progress Software Corp. v. MySQL AB, 195 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. 
Mass. 2002), and Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
 143. Matthew D. Stein, Rethinking UCITA: Lessons from the Open Source Movement, 58 ME. L. 
REV. 157, 193 (2006). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
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who actually work to change and improve the code or to develop new projects.  
The remaining users ride the coattails of the developers for free.146  This is the 
archetypal tragedy of the commons situation, where people “overuse” or fail to take 
care of resources owned in common, and suggests that some aspect of private 
ownership may be necessary to balance open source and optimize attempts to 
promote innovation.  
VIII.  SUGGESTIONS FOR OPTIMIZING BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 
The discussion above, together with the realization that open source 
approaches fail to address both aspects of the two-prong policy objectives behind 
the Constitution’s goal of promoting innovation, suggest a solution to the Science 
Commons’ failure to promote innovation.  Specifically, the traditional modes of 
intellectual property protection were created to promote innovation through the 
dual approach of (1) increasing the amount of material in the commons, and (2) 
rewarding inventors and creators for their work with a temporary monopoly.147  
The Science Commons is exclusively directed to increasing the amount of material 
in the commons and does not address the second approach.148  However, as 
indicated in Part VII.B of this Comment, a rich public domain alone, without 
providing material incentive for inventors and creators, may fail to stimulate 
innovation.  This is particularly true in a field such as biotechnology, which 
requires heavy investment, and where, as a result, financial rewards for innovation 
may be necessary.  Biotechnology innovation would be stimulated most by both 
increasing the amount of material in the commons and by rewarding inventors and 
creators for their work with a limited time monopoly such as that conferred by 
patent rights. 
This is not to imply that the traditional patenting approach is the best 
alternative.  As suggested by Opderbeck, the genetic code may be a candidate well-
suited for open source approaches because this “layer” is most similar to computer 
programming code.149  As such, the ideal system for promoting innovation in 
biotechnology would be a combination of open source and traditional patenting.  
This dual approach would prevent both the tragedy of the commons150 and the 
tragedy of the anticommons.  
Combinations of traditional approaches and open source have been proposed 
                                                                                                     
 146. Two friends who are computer programmers employed by Microsoft first suggested this point of 
view.  They stated that most high quality programmers do not bother working with open source software 
because of the large number of bugs that do not get fixed, because no one “owns” the software and takes 
responsibility for fixing errors that arise.  Problems with users that do not contribute to the code have 
been suggested in various other places as well.  See 5 Ways to Contribute Open Source Projects Without 
Coding, NONGEEK PERSPECTIVE, http://nongeeksight.blogspot.com/2006/09/5-ways-to-contribute-to-
open-source.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). 
 147. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 148. As noted in supra Part IV, the Creative Commons provides some incentive to creators in the 
form of rights such as maintaining artistic control.  However, limited rights that do not offer material 
rewards are unlikely to be useful in the field of biotechnology, as discussed in supra Part VII.A.   
 149. See supra Part VII.A.  For the purposes of this Comment, Benkler’s theory and Opderbeck’s 
application thereof are adopted as correct. 
 150. The tragedy of the commons in an open source system is suggested in supra Part VII where 
many users rely on a piece of software, but few contribute to its maintenance and improvement. 
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as replacements for the current system.  Law professor Peter Lee suggests that 
publicly funded scientific research promotes commercial innovation by creating 
massive amounts of basic scientific knowledge such as gene sequences,151 which is 
an example of the upstream knowledge where excessive patenting can have the 
most damaging blocking effects.  As such, Lee suggests that the key to maximizing 
biotechnology innovation is creating a “distributive commons” where institutions 
conducting research with the benefit of public funds should distribute the results of 
their research under quid pro quo licenses, leveraging the power of their upstream 
developments (such as research tools) in order to maximize access to downstream 
health technologies (such as pharmaceuticals) to the largest possible user base.152  
Professor Lee’s approach, although correct in focusing on increasing the 
availability of upstream knowledge such as gene sequences or other research 
tools,153 fails to appreciate the role of commercial players in adopting open source 
approaches.  Given that most biotechnology research requires significant private 
expenditure, which may be funded by the licenses associated with exclusive patent 
rights, it is counterintuitive that a company would be willing to forego patent rights 
and “donate” data or research to the public domain.  However, sharing of upstream 
knowledge by commercial entities has already happened.  Although such sharing is 
not born out of generosity but out of worry for competing ownership claims,154 the 
results are the same: preventing anticommons concerns.  
In some specific areas, such as expressed sequence tags or ESTs,155 big 
pharmaceutical companies took initiative even before the patent office had an 
opportunity to evaluate whether patents should be granted for ESTs.156  Companies 
decided they were better off donating gene-fragment data to the public rather than 
seeking patents.157  These companies hoped that donating their EST data to the 
public domain would prevent patents on these sequences from delaying 
downstream research that depended on access to this data.158  As an example of this 
approach, in 1995, Merck created the Gene Index (a public database of gene 
sequences).  By 1998, Merck had published almost a million gene sequences on 
this database, which were entirely in the public domain.159  Similar results were 
                                                                                                     
 151. Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917, 941 (2009).   
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 159. Id.  See also Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 
188-89 (2004) (discussing the Merck project). 
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achieved in the area of single nucleotide polymorphisms,160 or SNPs, by the SNP 
Consortium, a group consisting of private firms and nonprofit research 
organizations intent on preempting an anticommons patent thicket from 
developing.161  Law professor Robert Merges has coined the phrase “property-
preempting investments” for instances such as these where a private firm spends 
significant sums of money to create assets in the public domain in order to preempt 
intellectual property rights.162  
The fact that some institutions have taken matters into their own hands and are 
circumventing traditional patent practice in order to prevent stifling of innovation 
strongly suggests that patent practice itself should be changed in order to stimulate 
innovation rather than relying on solutions to come from the private sector.  This is 
especially true given that the activities of Merck and the SNP Consortium are the 
exception rather than the rule.  This notion is supported by three studies concerning 
the effect of over-proliferation of patents in technological innovation.163  These 
three reports conclude that it should be harder to obtain patents in the first place.  
The first report by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice 
concluded that “biotechnology patents might harm follow-on innovation through 
the creation of an anticommons.”164   The solutions proposed included reforms that 
would make it more difficult to obtain patents initially and also more difficult to 
sustain them later on in the face of litigation.165  The second report by the National 
Academy of Science investigated operations at the United States Patent Office 
(USPTO), and found that patent quality seems to be declining, and made similar 
recommendations.166  The third report by the National Research Council focused 
specifically on biotechnology patents and also “concluded . . . that the standard for 
patenting should be strengthened.”167  
This Comment suggests a more nuanced approach to reforming the patent 
system that applies the lessons from the analysis of open source approaches above.  
Specifically, not all biotechnology patents should be more difficult to obtain: only 
those patents directed to upstream technologies such as gene sequences or other 
research tools.  This strategy should work together with existing open source 
initiatives to promote easier access to such upstream technologies.  Researchers 
working on downstream projects would be free to use upstream technologies in the 
public domain to develop valuable downstream inventions such as pharmaceuticals.  
Under this system, particularly deserving upstream technologies and downstream 
technologies would remain protectable by traditional patent property rights.  This 
                                                                                                     
 160. A single nucleotide polymorphism is a DNA sequence variation occurring when a single 
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approach would work to stimulate innovation by both increasing the materials in 
the public domain and providing financial incentives where appropriate.  
The number of upstream patents granted could be reduced in several ways.  
The first would be a return to the stricter statutory notion that abstract concepts and 
ideas cannot be patented.168  The idea that basic facts and natural phenomena are 
not protectable under the utility requirement has softened considerably over the last 
century.169  Patents for naturally occurring substances were traditionally rejected as 
being directed to non-patentable subject matter until Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. 
Mulford Co., where a patent was granted directed to a purified form of adrenalin (a 
naturally occurring hormone).170  Since this watershed moment, patents for 
genetically modified organisms171 and mathematical algorithms for use in a 
particular manner have been granted.172  Gene sequences of existing organisms or 
mutations associated with a particular disease have been heavily patented under 
these expansions.  However, it is arguable that these “inventions” are merely 
naturally existing works that were discovered rather than invented and should not 
have been patented based on the subject matter requirement of section 101 of Title 
35.173  Therefore, a stricter interpretation by examiners at the USPTO as to what is 
patentable under the subject matter requirement could prevent such patents from 
being granted.174  This precise position was recently put forth in an expansive 
decision by the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York, 
holding that patents to naturally occurring gene sequences were invalid because 
natural gene sequences were a product of nature and thus impermissible under the 
subject matter requirement of section 101.175  Although this decision will certainly 
be appealed, it could mark a change in how the courts view the patentability (or un-
patentability) of upstream biotechnology, such as gene sequences.  
The number of patents granted should also be reduced through a stricter 
application of the obviousness standard.176  A recent Supreme Court decision held 
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that the obviousness standard should be more strictly applied.177  With application 
of this stricter standard, it should become more challenging to patent inventions 
that were simply the result of routine work, such as sequencing a gene.  As such, 
upstream discoveries, such as the discovery of a gene sequence, would not be 
patentable, whereas truly inventive downstream technologies would be.    
Another possibility to reduce the number of patents granted would be to 
implement a third party observation or opposition system at the USPTO.178  Patent 
offices in other countries around the world allow independent third parties to 
present references (journal articles, other patents, etc.) that pre-date the patent 
application for the Examiner to consider when evaluating an application.179  This 
type of involvement should result in more relevant references being introduced to 
the Examiner at an earlier stage and result in fewer or narrower patents being 
granted.  For example, although Examiners carry out searches, there are instances 
where relevant references do not come to light.  If a third party brought these 
disclosures to the attention of the Examiner, it may be necessary to deny the patent 
application because the subject matter is known in the field or would have been 
obvious over what was already known in the field.180  
Approaches such as these that result in fewer patents should appeal to 
researchers on a practical level.  Patenting gene sequences or other research tools is 
extremely costly, and such patents generally show a poor return on investment in 
terms of the licensing potential.181  Furthermore, upstream inventions like gene 
sequences are more often developed by researchers in nonprofit institutions than by 
those in companies, and it has been suggested that the developers of research tools 
are more akin to hackers than other researchers and are more interested in sharing 
results to further research than in patenting inventions for commercial gain.182  
In addition to the patent-reducing measures discussed above, both nonprofit 
and commercial researchers should be encouraged to adopt open source approaches 
to sharing data where appropriate, such as by contributing gene sequences to online 
databases or by publishing research in an open access journal.  This combination of 
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open access to upstream materials and traditional protection for downstream 
inventions should stimulate innovation. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
Although the legislation underlying the protection of copyrights and patents 
was adopted in order to spur innovation, it appears that an over-proliferation of 
property rights may in fact stifle further creations and developments.  The open 
source movement was spawned in an attempt to counter this over-proliferation and 
increase innovation by expanding the material available in the public domain.  
Open source approaches, such as Creative Commons, have been successful in 
replacing traditional copyright in some situations, leading to the notion of applying 
open source approaches to biotechnology to increase the amount of material in the 
public domain.  
Unfortunately, the three main projects of Science Commons fail to promote 
innovation and are largely redundant, unnecessary, or unusable.  However, the 
problem may not be with the approaches adopted by Science Commons but rather 
the nature of open source itself.  Open source may not be as successful as its 
proponents claim, and even if it is functional, it may not be adaptable to the field of 
biotechnology where financial incentives and clear enforcement rules are crucial.  
As such, increasing material available in the public domain alone is insufficient to 
promote innovation: inventors may need commercial incentives such as the 
economic benefits conferred by traditional patent rights.  
This Comment postulates a compromise where premarket or upstream 
knowledge, such as unknown gene sequences or other research tools, are shared 
through open source systems like Science Commons, but downstream, marketable 
developments, such as pharmaceuticals that act on the gene to treat a particular 
disease, are patentable according to intellectual property norms.  These upstream 
materials would be included in the public domain through a combination of open 
source approaches and stricter patenting processes whereby it becomes very 
challenging to patent upstream inventions.  This system maximizes shared 
knowledge by publicizing information that is generally not patentable anyway, 
potentially making further development easier.  Downstream innovation relying on 
these upstream materials would be invigorated as a result, and these downstream 
inventions should be protected by traditional patent means when appropriate.  A 
system of this sort should encourage innovation at all levels, from individual users 
to large pharmaceutical companies. 
 
